One objection that has been raised regarding a theistic view of morality as absolute and objective is that of Euthyphro’s Dilemma. The dilemma was posed by the philosopher Socrates to a religious scholar named Euthyphro, since then it has been reformulated for a monotheistic God. The dilemma simply poses the question: Does God will certain acts because they are moral, or are certain acts moral because they are willed by God?” In this paper I will argue a solution that seems not only possible, but necessary given the theists definition of God.
The theist has been trapped into a corner with two seemingly impossible solutions. The first horn asserts that God merely recognizes morality. The obvious problem with arguing for this option is that there is some standard that is above God, a standard which God must conform to. If God is moral in the sense that he fits the mold of an external moral law morality is independent of God, which is exactly the opposite of what the theist is attempting to prove. The second horn poses a different problem, for if morality is whatever God decides, than morality is arbitrary. God might have decided that rape and murder were moral actions. As Bertrand Russell once said, “If the only basis for morality is God’s decrees, it follows that they might just as well have been the opposite of what they are” (pg. 48). If morality is whatever God decides it to be, morality loses all authority and becomes subjective which is precisely what the theist is trying to argue against.
For a solution to be viable for the theist it must meet two requirements. First the alleged solution must make morality objective. And second the alleged solution must make God the foundation for this objective morality. My proposed argument goes as follows:
P1: It is greater to be the standard of morality than to conform to it
P2: If God is the greatest conceivable being then he must be the standard of morality.
P3: If God is the standard of morality His nature is necessarily morally perfect.
C: Therefore since His nature is necessarily perfect, God can serve as a foundation for objective moral truths.
P2 must be accepted by the one posing the dilemma as discussion can only occur when the poser evaluates a certain view of God and His relation to morality. The burden of proof is on the one posing the dilemma to find a flaw in a proposed solution, as the dilemma is a positive assertion.
P1 is philosophically solid as it is a greater thing to be the paradigm of goodness than to conform to an external standard, for if one conforms to an external standard that one is subject to a thing greater than itself. Since P2 defines God as the greatest conceivable being, by the theist’s own definition this God is necessarily the standard of morality. Since he is the standard of morality there is no other standard by which he can be judged making his nature necessarily morally perfect. The moral nature of God is an essential property of Gods meaning that there is no possible world in which God according to the theist’s definition could have existed and yet lacked that property. This must not be confused with accepting the second horn of the dilemma, for if God was not necessarily morally perfect then morality is subjective. Since God is necessarily morally perfect according to the theist’s definition the theist sees no problem is claiming that this deity can serve as a foundation for objective values. God is moral neither because of the way He happens to be nor because of His fitness with reference to an external standard of morality, His moral nature is an essential quality of His which if existing according to the theistic definition must make him the moral standard.
The solution proposed is not without its objections. One common objection is that if goodness is what God must be, why call bother calling Him good? Calling God good is merely saying that God is consistent with his nature. Regardless of its truth, this argument is irrelevant to the discussion at hand, for to argue this would be to confuse moral ontology with moral semantics. Christian philosopher William Lane Craig states that “The claim that moral values and duties are rooted in God is a meta-ethical claim about moral ontology, not moral semantics […] It is fundamentally a claim about the metaphysical status of moral properties, not a claim about the meaning of moral sentences” (pg. 212). In addition most theists see no problem in accepting that goodness and morality are merely words used to describe God.
Another objection might be that the theist is begging the question when he or she assumes P2. Since God’s perfect goodness is part of his greatness, the theist is assuming that God is the standard for objective morality before the argument is made. It must be reiterated that all the theist is attempting to accomplish is show a possible state in which God can serve as a possible standard for objective moral truths. All the theist must do to solve the dilemma is to offer a view of God who is the perfect standard of absolute morality by virtue of His existence. If any being is perfect by definition, then if that being exists it has the power to be a standard by which others can be measured to. The theist can simply say that they believe God to be necessarily perfect in every regard, which would render the dilemma useless against this particular definition of God. God, described as the greatest conceivable being, if existing is the standard for objective morality by very definition. The solution is not stating that God is the objective moral standard because theists believe God to be the objective moral standard, for this would be tautology and circular reasoning; rather the argument is that God can be the standard for objective morality because of Gods necessary moral perfection.
While this dilemma posed a formidable problem for the polytheist who like Euthyphro believed the gods to be a group of limited individuals, the modern day monotheist can avoid this dilemma by using the modern day concept of God as a maximally great being. To answer the dilemma the theist can offer a third solution rendering it a false dilemma, and state that acts are deemed either moral or immoral based upon their conformity or lack thereof to Gods moral nature, which is essential to His being.
Craig, L William “Philosophy of Religion”
Rutgers University Press (2002)
Russell, Bertrand “Why I am not a Christian”
Taken from a lecture given on March 6, 1927 to the National Secular Society.
Posted by Philip Davis 
